Vladimir Putin has in recent years become a hero for many conservatives and those on the Alt-Right. Nationalist leaders like Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen, and Viktor Orban see in Putin an ally and kindred spirit. European Nationalist attendees of the International Russian Conservative Forum in St. Petersburg last spring were bathed in propaganda glorifying the Russian leader. Even the hosts of the Daily Shoah routinely vocalize their sympathy for Putin. Curt Doolittle recently coined a neologism that perfectly describes these people: “Slavaboo, someone who is a fanboy of Slavic culture but they’re too lazy to actually learn any of the Slavic culture, language, or customs.” Someone who knows Russia and Putin’s regime very well will tell you that the reason these people are so deeply misguided about Russia and its leader is because Putin’s propaganda machine abroad has done its job very effectively.
Based on such propaganda, Western nationalists commonly believe that Putin, unlike their own politicians, is a living embodiment of true masculinity combined with adamant patriotism and eagerness to preserve Christianity and ethnic homogeneity. They see Putin as someone who, unlike his American counterpart, has the guts to simultaneously fight ISIS, Western progressivism, and the American World Order. Those who believe in this stereotype have been profoundly misguided.
First and foremost, Putin’s foreign policy is not part of a “master plan” to fight terrorism, increase stability, or bolster Russia’s “national interests.” Many believe that Putin should be admired for intervening in Syria to defeat ISIS. Given the popular support of his enemies, Putin’s military campaign Syria is more likely to turn into a second Afghanistan war than a decisive victory. Russian involvement with this Middle Eastern conflict is pointless: Syria will never bring Russia any territorial or economic gains, nor will Russia boost its global status or strengthen its influence in the Middle East.
In hindsight, the Soviet Union was also an enthusiastic sponsor of African and Middle Eastern dictatorships. Eventually, those dictators abandoned their Soviet sponsors without even paying back their loans. By the same token, in Syria, Putin is just a fool who is being used by Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian intelligence groups for their own pragmatic interests. Putin is flexing his muscles in Syria for at least three short-term reasons: to bolster his personal image, to embarrass Obama, and to distract Russians from rapidly deteriorating economic conditions at home.
However, such shortsighted goals may come at too high price given the volatile conditions in Syria. The fact that Putin is propping up a minority Shiite dictator against a majority Sunni rebellion may lead to further destabilization of the region as well as inviting blowback in the predominantly Sunni Muslim republics inside of Russia. The recent downing of Metrojet flight 9268 over the Sinai Peninsula may be a sign of more to come.
Putin’s other recent foreign policy adventures, including the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, should be viewed as a demonstration of the expansionist ambitions of a Russian leader who called the collapse of the Soviet Union “the major geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century.” Putin wants Russia to be viewed as a the de-facto leader of the post-Soviet zone, the primary force determining the territorial composition and governance of the former Soviet republics. Indicatively, both wars were accompanied by propaganda presenting Russia as a defender of the so-called “Russian world” (i.e. Russian-speaking minorities living abroad) from murderous fascists in Georgia/Crimea backed by the West.
Ironically, while decrying Western involvement in the Ukraine, Putin’s officials kept denying the presence of any Russian troops in Ukraine for almost a year. Russia instead claimed that the “the polite people” aka “little green men” in uniform were Crimean self-defense forces. In Crimea, to restore Russia’s dominance in the region, Putin created a narrative; Khrushchev irresponsibly gave away historically Russian land (Crimea), thus the seizure of Crimea was merely fixing a historical mistake. Blogger RamZPaul went so far as to call Putin “The Russian Neo-Con.”
In response to Western sanctions over the annexation of Crimea, Putin outlawed food exports from Europe and the U.S. – a measure that hurt Russian citizens and small businesses far more than the exporting countries. A year after the imposition of the ban, Putin ordered the destruction of all seized imports in a barbaric spectacle. Illegally imported cheeses and produce were bulldozed and mixed with dirt. Pork and squid were torched in incinerators. In a country where 15% of the population lives in abject poverty, such measures are more likely to provoke anger rather than patriotism. The wanton destruction of foodstuffs reveals another important feature of Putin’s country, namely the omnipresent corruption. Prior to Putin’s latest order, Russian officials and customs accepted bribes to turn a blind eye to the restricted goods entering the country.
Despite Putin’s obsession with his image abroad, he cares little about the well-being of his citizens. Russia under Putin with its ample natural resources has been turned into a revenue distribution mechanism for Putin’s close friends. Putin’s economy is essentially confined to management of extractive industries (primarily, oil and gas), where state control, state subsidies and state-owned corporations prevail. To protect his cronies and their assets from attempts to expose their ill-gotten gains, Putin approved a law that makes officials’ income, real estate, and other assets classified.
To obfuscate the reasons why its citizens are so poor despite the country’s abundant resources, the regime spreads a propaganda campaign telling the Russian people that they are poor because the entire world is against them. The world is against them because it is envious of Russian moral superiority. As anyone who has been to Russia can attest, “Russian moral superiority” is an absurdity.
Many ethno-nationalists view Putin as the “savior of the white race.” Counter to this widespread belief, Putin is not a defender of ethnic Russians. Russia has seen a steady influx of non-Russian immigrants over the past 15 years. According to the Rosstat, Russia has seen net in-migration, with most of the immigrants coming from poor Muslim countries like Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. In 2014 alone, 517,000 people immigrated from the CIS. However, adjusting for illegal immigration, that number is most likely over 650,000. In early 2015, an estimated 10 million labor migrants (so called “gastarbeiters”) legally entered Russia for work. However, there are approximately 5 million more illegal immigrants in the country. At the same time, there are at least 4 million able-body unemployed ethnic Russians. The trend here is reminiscent of the United States: Putin’s government imports cheap labor from a backwards neighbor, while turning poor whites into dalits dependent on crime and handouts.
While ethnic Russians, mainly Slavic and Orthodox, are in decline, Russia’s indigenous Muslim population is on the rise. Stratfor reports that “at the fall the Soviet Union, Russia’s Muslim population stood at 9 percent, and currently is nearly 13 percent. By 2030 it is estimated to be 16 percent.” Today, out of a total Russian population of 144 million, there are 20-30 million Muslims. In addition to the migration problem, Russia struggles with the same birth rate differential issue as Western Europe. During the 1990s, ethnic Russian birthrate dropped precipitously, while the Muslim population has remained fecund.
One serious impact of the lack of children has been a decline in the population of military-age men. In its most recent draft, Russia was only able to recruit 154,000 men, roughly half the number needed to sustain Moscow’s goal of one million service members. To mitigate this problem, in January 2015, Russia started recruiting foreign contractors to serve in its military. Most dangerously for the future of Russia, the new measures make foreign soldiers eligible to apply for Russian citizenship. This option is particularly attractive to citizens of Russia’s impoverished Muslim neighbors, the Central Asian Republics, who would otherwise come illegally to Russia and work at menial jobs. Emigrants leaving Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are the primary beneficiaries of the new rules. Tajik remittances from Russia constitute half of Tajikistan’s GDP. Far from being a white ethno-state, Russia is growing more Muslim by the year.
Contrary to the beliefs of many recent converts to Orthodoxy, Putin is not a guardian of Christendom. At a glorious ceremony in September, Putin convened 10,000 Muslims in Moscow to open the largest mosque in Europe. He himself once said: “We’ve got eastern Orthodoxy… some Christian theorists say that we are rather closer to Islam than, say, to Catholicism.”
The Russian Orthodox Church has discredited itself long ago by becoming riddled with corruption. It is well known that Church clergy are closely tied to state authorities. It gives moral approval of and provides ideological foundation for Putin’s policies, while criticizing Western sins, such as greed. At the same time, religious authorities are frequently spotted traveling in private jets, driving luxurious cars, and wearing Rolexes watch – no matter how thoroughly their images are photoshopped by the pro-Kremlin media. Many Russian churches have been transformed from holy places of worship to hubs of trade; one can now buy food, drinks, jewelry, and religious utensils of all sorts. While Putin’s defenders would point to the construction of 25,000 churches, old churches with historical and religious significance are being abandoned, largely because they are less profitable than newer city churches.
Much of Putinist Russia’s new-found piety is a mere affectation. According to recent polls, 61% of Russians who identify themselves as Russian Orthodox say that they have never read the Bible. Although many Russians wear a cross and were baptized in the Orthodox Church, the majority of Russians are not religious. One-third of Russians, for instance, can cite none of the Ten Commandments. Most Russians rarely go to church, and even if they do, very few participate in religious ceremonies or follow any religious traditions.
Putin’s relations with Muslims in the Caucuses should also cause some to question his judgment. Putin has granted a special status to Chechnya and its leader Ramzan Kadyrov. After two Chechen Wars, Putin and Kadyrov cut a deal: Putin agreed not to meddle with Chechnya and Kadyrov’s policies there in exchange for Kadyrov’s personal loyalty and maintenance of peace in the region. As a result, Kadyrov’s cronies (the so-called Kadyrovtsy) do whatever they want, both in Chechnya, where they abuse and torture people, and in Russia, where they have killed opposition leaders. At the same time, Moscow pours almost a billion dollars per year into Grozny to keep the unruly Muslim region peaceful. According to Samuel Ramani, “Kadyrov’s pro-Putin stance is based on his ability to blackmail the Kremlin into helping him consolidate his personal authority over Chechnya in exchange for cooperation with Russia in confronting security threats in the North Caucasus.”
Meanwhile, terror attacks in Russia continue. The majority of them occur in Russian North Caucasus and in the Black Sea region where there exists a large community of ethnic Russians. Kadyrov’s power has expanded to such an extent that, while Chechnya is nominally part of the Russian Federation, in practice it exists as Kadyrov’s own fiefdom, with its own ideology, economy, and a 40,000-strong army loyal directly to Kadyrov. While in theory, Kadyrov is Putin’s puppet, in reality, Kadyrov largely acts with impunity. Putin tolerates Kadyrov’s governance, arbitrary detentions, and extra-judicial killings largely because he believes the Chechnya model can be copied in other restive Islamic regions. Putin also turns a blind eye towards brutal killings of whistleblowers, in which Ramzan is allegedly involved: investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya, rights activist Natalia Estemirova, pro-Moscow Chechen Ruslan Yamadayev and his brother Sulim Yamadayev, and most recently Kremlin critic and politician Boris Nemtsov.
Some of the confusion on the Alt-Right regarding Putin is understandable given Putin’s massive disinformation campaign. Propaganda is an integral part of Putinist Russia. These days, Russia’s major media outlets have become the cogs of the Kremlin propaganda machine, except for a handful which dare to remain independent. The grand campaign’s tools include disinformation, manipulation of facts, blackwashing the West, direct attempts to shift public opinion abroad–aka Russia Today–and the so-called “troll factories.” Russia’s notorious troll factories utilize government employees to generate “pro-Kremlin dialogue” under fake accounts. At least 300 employees are tasked to produce comments, posts, pictures, videos, and attack on “dissidents” in forums and on social media on a 24/7 basis.
While few readers of this essay have any illusions of equivalency between democracy and good governance, under Putin, elections have lost any pretense of legitimacy. The victory of Putin at another round of presidential elections and the winning of a majority of seats in Parliament by his United Russia party were decided long in advance. Putin enjoys essentially unlimited power to change both the laws and the Constitution to suit his will. As a few examples, Putin extended the presidential term from 4 to 6 years, he abolished elections to the Russian Federation Council (the upper house of Parliament), and he replaced gubernatorial elections with presidential appointments.
Dependents of federal largesse, so-called “budgetniks,” such as public school teachers, state hospital staff, retired people, etc., are paid to vote for Putin and his party. They vote several times on election day and engage in ballot box stuffing. If the result of machine politics was a wealthy and prosperous Russia, one might turn a blind eye. But absent the commodity boom, which Putin had no power over, it’s hard to see how Putin’s policies have enriched politically-unconnected Russians. Meanwhile, Putin’s cronies and other loyal politicians not only get a good share of the pie, they also enjoy legal immunity. A governor who is exposed by a whistleblower-journalist can easily hire a killer and get rid of the critic with no fear of being questioned or punished. As a result of this impunity and the fact that elections are rigged, politicians barely even conceal their contempt for the electorate.
Putin is a man who cares very little about the well-being of his citizens and a great deal about his image abroad. On the one hand, he sees how weak the West has become in the face of new emerging dangers (Islamic terrorism, national separatist movements, mass immigration) because of its excessive political correctness, obsession with “human rights,” and progressivism. By claiming to stand against such trends, he often garners support from those on the Alt-Right.
What right-thinking man would oppose the rise of a strong determined leader who values sovereignty and defends ethnic interests, the nuclear family, Christianity, and patriotism? Sadly, that viewpoint is largely a construction of Putin’s finely-tuned propaganda machine. As anyone who has driven in Putin’s Russia can tell you, outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg, Russia is a lot closer to your average third-world country than it is to Germany or the United Kingdom. While the country claims to be far more moral than the West, the country is rife with divorce, infidelity, alcoholism, and abortion. Putin’s government still maintains a Soviet-like attitude towards efficiency and corruption. Putin is not even close to being the “savior of the white race.”